This paper presents a novel protocol for achieving secure and fair document exchange among multiparties. The protocol has the following characteristics: it employs no trusted (third) party when a majority of the parties involved behave honestly; it adopts a technique for integrity and originality verification of messages without use of either asymmetric (public key) or symmetric (conventional) encryption; and it maximises the use of hash and polynomial functions. In comparison with existing protocols, this new protocol has a number of advantages such as better flexibility and reliability. The protocol is also assessed with respect to a set of requirements such as atomicity and assurance.
INTRODUCTION
One of the principal activities in electronic commerce is concerned with secure and fair document exchange among multi-parties. This usually occurs when exchanged documents contain valuable information. Examples of such exchange include exchange of a payment for a receipt of some valuable electronic goods, exchange of different parties' signatures on the same contract, exchange of a certified e-mail for an acknowledgement of its reception, and exchange of valuable electronic goods among a group of barterers [1, 2] .
The main problem with document exchange is illustrated by the following simple scenario. Consider a number of parties who wish to exchange particular documents so that collectively these documents can provide more valuable information, e.g. on a company's shares. Suppose that the exchange starts with some of the parties first sending their documents to the others and hoping that they will receive the others' documents very soon. Having received the documents from these parties, the others may delay sending, or may not even send their documents. As a result, those who have sent out the documents are disadvantaged.
Obviously, document exchange must be secure to prevent any dishonest party from deceiving others, and fair to avoid the situation where some parties have received their expected documents (e.g. receipts, payments or signatures), while others have not, at the end of the exchange.
Over the past few years, researchers have been working on the design of protocols to achieve secure and fair document exchange [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . A simple approach to such a design is to employ a strong trusted (third) party as an intermediary to actively take part in document collection, verification and distribution [10, 13] . A major problem with this approach is that the trusted party may become a performance and security bottleneck, and its security compromise could lead to disastrous consequences.
An alternative approach is to adopt a weak trusted party to offer some services, such as random signal generation [15] or reliable mediation [1, 3, 4] , which assist parties in reaching their agreement on document exchange.
Some protocols based on this approach may require tight time synchronisation between different parties [15] , which reduces its applicability in heterogeneous and distributed network environments. Others assume that trusted parties and/or their associated communication channels are reliable [4] , which may not be realistic in current network environments. Additionally, the weak trusted parties need proper protection even though their security is not as important as that of the above strong trusted party.
Another approach uses no trusted party, and relies solely on some randomised algorithms [9] and/or gradual secret releasing schemes [7, 8, 14] that assure different parties have similar probabilities of receiving their expected documents. There are two main weaknesses with this approach. First, to achieve an acceptable level of such probabilities, it requires a sufficiently large number of messages to be generated and exchanged, which has an adverse impact on its performance. Secondly, it requires that different parties have (approximately) equal computing power, which is unrealistic in heterogeneous and distributed network environments.
The aim of this paper is to propose a novel protocol for achieving secure and fair document exchange among multiparties, which makes use of good properties in existing protocols and eliminates their weaknesses. The protocol adopts mixed features of the last two approaches described 570 N. ZHANG et al. above. This allows the protocol to operate flexibly with regard to given circumstances. That is, the protocol employs no trusted party in less hostile situations, and uses one or more weak trusted parties otherwise without any change to the protocol. The philosophy behind this protocol is to request every party to encrypt his document to be exchanged, and then to multicast it together with the data items associated with the key for the document decryption. These data items allow other parties to jointly hold the key after the multicasting, so the key owner is no longer the sole holder of the key. The data items are selected based on two principles:
(i) A minority of parties involved cannot use the items to work out the key, even if they collude, before the items are legitimately and jointly revealed by a given number of parties at a later stage of the protocol run. (ii) After that stage, no parties can stop others computing the key based on the revealed data items and then viewing the document, even if they collude.
The satisfaction of these principles enables the protocol to achieve secure and fair document exchange among multiparties.
This proposed protocol shows the following interesting characteristics:
(i) It does not distinguish between ordinary parties engaging in the exchange process and trusted parties that are assumed to follow the protocol correctly.
The demand for involvement of trusted parties in the protocol operation depends on the degree of trust among the ordinary parties. The protocol requires no involvement of any trusted party if a majority of the parties are believed to be honest (i.e. they follow the protocol correctly), and needs one or more trusted parties otherwise. When needed, a trusted party acts exactly like any honest ordinary party. This simplifies the protocol implementation by eliminating any special considerations about management and protection of the trusted parties. (ii) It employs hash and polynomial functions rather than asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric (conventional) encryption for secure transmission of messages and proof of their integrity and originality. This improves the protocol efficiency. (iii) The protocol is capable of tolerating unreliable communications or malicious attacks as its successful completion relies only on some of the parties, rather than all of them, correctly operating the protocol. This increases the ability of the protocol to operate properly in unreliable network environments. (iv) The protocol offers high security assurance to prevent security breaches, even in the case where a number of dishonest parties (i.e. they do not correctly follow the protocol for some malicious purposes) collude in an attempt to deceive the others or to disrupt the protocol operation. (v) The protocol requires no equal computing power among parties, and normally generates no excessive number of messages. It is thus more suitable for distributed and heterogeneous network environments.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2, we first specify a set of security requirements which the proposed protocol needs to comply with, and then the assumptions, notation and algorithms to be used for the protocol presentation are summarised. Based on these preliminary descriptions, the protocol is formally presented in Section 3. The compliance of the protocol with the security requirements is analysed in Section 4, and its comparisons with other protocols for multi-party fair exchange are given in Section 5. Finally, our conclusions and future work are outlined in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES

Requirements
Ideally, a protocol for fair document exchange should satisfy the following requirements:
(1) Viability: At the end of a successful protocol run, every party involved should be able to view all the parties' documents that are unforgeable, verifiable and nonrepudiatable [17] . (2) Atomicity: The protocol should ensure that all the parties are able to view the documents simultaneously. However, it is very difficult to use serial communication to achieve this simultaneity, if not impossible. We therefore require that the protocol be able to achieve atomicity in the sense that all of the parties, or none of them, can view the documents at the end of a protocol run. (3) Efficiency: The protocol should reasonably balance the communication and processing load carried out by each party so as to avoid any performance bottleneck. Additionally, the injection of messages into the underlying communication system, required by a protocol run, should be minimal. (4) Assurance: The protocol should prevent any party from gaining any document by misbehaviour, and hold any dishonest party accountable by presenting undeniable evidence of his misbehaviour. (5) Availability: The protocol should be able to tolerate system or communication failures. The implication of this is two-fold. Firstly, it is impossible for a dishonest party to exploit such failures to impair the protocol security. Secondly, a protocol run may still be able to complete despite the occurrence of some failures. (6) Applicability: The protocol should be workable in a heterogeneous and distributed network environment. This means that the protocol should impose minimum requirements on the parties' computing and time synchronisation capabilities.
Assumptions
The protocol to be presented in Section 3 is based on the following two assumptions: 
It is assumed that at most m (0 ≤ m < (n + 1)/2) out of the n parties might be dishonest, e.g. they intend to read other parties' documents without allowing the others to read theirs. The remaining n − m parties are assumed to be honest. The upper bound of m ensures that over half of the parties genuinely wish to exchange documents. The protocol guarantees that any collusion between these m dishonest parties can neither gain any advantage over the others nor disrupt the exchange process.
In the case where half of the parties or more are dishonest (i.e. m ≥ (n + 1)/2)), a solution is given in Section 4. (ii) Any two parties P i and P j (i = j ) have a shared secret key k i,j (=k j,i ), e.g. it can be computed using the method described in [19] . The method in [19] uses two values α and ρ that are known by both parties and must meet several conditions, e.g. ρ is a large prime. mod ρ, and similarly P i has k i,j = pk sk i j mod ρ. This method enables every party to easily compute a shared secret key with any other party, which is known only by both of them. We also assume that the public key of every party is certified, e.g. by a public-key authority, and that every party has obtained all the others' public keys.
Notation
The notation to be used throughout this paper is summarised as follows:
• x y means the concatenation of data items x and y.
• x i l≤i≤n signifies the concatenation of a subset of n − l +1 data items x i , which meet certain conditions stated separately.
• h(k, y) is a keyed one-way hash function with the following properties [20] : (a) for any key k and any data item y, it is easy to compute h(k, y); (b) given y and h(k, y), it is hard to compute k; (c) given k and h(k, y), it is hard to compute y; (d) given y, it is hard to find k and
and (e) given k, it is hard to find y and y (y = y ) such that h(k, y) = h(k, y ). • P i : m i means that a party P i multicasts a message m i to all the other n − 1 parties P j (1 ≤ j ≤ n and i = j ).
) signifies an encryption function which a party P i uses to securely transfer a message m i to each party P j using a value v and keys k i,j , as will be defined in Section 2.5.
• de(k i,j , v, a i,l n l=1 ) represents a decryption function which a party P j uses to recover a message from a value v and those a i,l received, as will be specified in Section 2.5.
Secret sharing
The protocol to be presented in Section 3 requires every party P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to select a session secret key s i for his document encryption and decryption. This key needs to be computable jointly by other parties at a later stage of the protocol run. To accomplish this, we adopt the method based on hash and polynomial functions presented in [20] , to allow other parties to secretly share the data related to s i without actually knowing s i , and later to compute s i from the data when they are published by these parties. This can prevent the case where P i is dishonest and refuses to hand out s i to other parties after having received their keys, as these parties can use the shared data to compute s i without any assistance from P i .
The method requires each party P i to decide coefficients for the pre-defined function below:
in which the coefficients a i,j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) are computed from the equations below:
Here, all computations are performed by the modulus operation with a large prime number ρ, N is the current session number agreed by all the parties, I j is P j 's identity, and k i,j (=sk i when i = j ) is the shared key between P i and P j defined in Section 2.2.
The use of the function h() in Equation (1) is intended to let every party P j easily calculate and hold a hash value h(k i,j , N I j ) associated with key s i . This hash value is called a (shared) secret of s i in this paper as it is known only by P i and P j . Revealing these secrets at a later stage will enable every party to recover s i . Since at most m parties are assumed to be dishonest, P i should allow any other party P j to procure s i when P j has obtained at least m + 1 revealed secrets. The reasons for this are twofold. First, if all the m dishonest parties collude in an attempt to gain s i before the secret revealing, they can get at most m secrets which are insufficient to procure s i . Second, if these dishonest parties maliciously withhold revelation of their secrets in order to stop other parties gaining s i , their attempt will not succeed as secrets revealed by at least m + 1 other parties are sufficient for each party to recover s i .
To fulfil the above procurement of 
The purpose of s i s i is to allow its recipients to check the integrity of s i , because any alteration to values f i (l) or secrets h(k i,j , N I j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m+1) will most likely result in a solution s i s i with s i = s i .
Secure message distribution
The method presented in Section 2.4 can also be used to securely transmit a message m i from a party P i to all the others by simply replacing s i in the function f i (χ) and Equations (1) with m i , and computing n values f i (1) , . . . , f i (n) which are then transferred to all the other parties. Having received these n values, every party P j solves the following equations for m i m i :
Equation (3) is just a special case of Equation (2) with m = 0.
As pointed out in [20] , secure message communication using the above method is more efficient than that using symmetric and/or asymmetric encryption, although other issues such as licensing and export control may be relevant as well.
In the case where each of the n parties needs to securely transmit a message to all the others, every party has to solve Equation (3) n − 1 times to obtain the messages from all the others. To avoid solving Equations (3), we can modify the method as follows. Let each party P i determine the predefined function below:
in which the coefficients a i,l (1 ≤ l ≤ n) are derived from the following equations:
where v is a value known by all the parties, ⊕ is the bitwise exclusive-or operator, and the bitsize of m i m i is assumed to be the same as that of the output of h(). Note that when m i is long it can be divided into a number of blocks, each of which can be sent out individually [20] using the above method. For simplicity, in this paper we assume that the document D i of any party P i is not longer than a block.
The benefits of this modified method are twofold. First, it is more efficient for a party to compute m i from values a i,l without solving any equations. Second, it allows a party P i to transfer different messages to different parties, e.g. m i in the last equation in Equation (4) could be replaced with a different message m i,n sent only to party P n .
However, to transfer a message m i , n values a i,l , each of which may have a size similar to that of m i , need to be transmitted, so the efficiency of the above method may be overshadowed by the increased traffic load. The amount of traffic increase is dependent on the number of parties (i.e. n), which is small in most applications.
For ease of presentation, en(m i , v, k i,j n j =1 ), called an 'encryption' function, will be used to express values a i,l that satisfy Equation (4)
. This function says that party P i securely sends m i to every party P j . Accordingly,
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The philosophy behind this new protocol is to let each party disseminate secrets, associated with his session key for document encryption and decryption, to different parties as described in Section 2.4. By legitimately revealing some of these secrets at a later stage, every party involved can recover the key. This means that after the dissemination, a party is no longer the sole holder of his key, and the key is now also held jointly by other parties. On the one hand, this prevents any dishonest parties from impairing the protocol security as addressed in Section 2.4. On the other hand, it enables the protocol to tolerate failures of some communication channels, which often occur in real systems, because the success of a protocol run relies only on some of the parties, rather than all of them, correctly revealing secrets.
The operation of the protocol can be informally described in the following five stages:
1. Document distribution: every party selects a session key, then uses it to generate relevant values f i (l) as described in Section 2.4, and sends these values along with his document encrypted with the session key to all the other parties. 2. Acknowledgement broadcasting: every party responds to receipt of the documents and values. 3. Willingness announcement: each party that has got all the expected acknowledgements informs all the others that he is willing to reveal the secrets held. 4. Secret revealing: each party that has announced his willingness for secret revelation and received a predefined number of willingnesses from other parties, transfers the held secrets to all the others, so that any party can use the revealed secrets to compute all the keys and apply them to decrypt all the documents. 5. Message recovery: any party that did not receive all the expected messages in the previous stages due to unreliable communications or malicious attacks, ought to request for re-transmission of the messages to recover all the keys and/or documents.
Formally, these five stages are represented by the five transactions listed in Figure 1 . The details of these transactions are presented below.
Stage 1-Document distribution
In this stage, all the parties exchange their encrypted documents and data associated with the decryption keys. This is achieved by every party P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) executing the transaction (T 1 ) below to transmit a message to all the other parties. The message consists of P i 's identity I i , the
current session number N, his encrypted document E i , a set F i of values (i.e. f i (1) , . . . , f i (n−m) defined in Section 2.4) for the computation of P i 's decryption key, a set V i of values for verification of the secrets associated with the key which will be revealed later, and P i 's signature S i, 1 . This message allows other parties to obtain P i 's encrypted document and the necessary data for computation and verification of the document decryption key to be performed in later stages.
Transaction (T 1 ) is defined as follows:
• N is the current session number to prevent a dishonest party from replaying a message issued in a previous session.
showing that P i securely distributes his document D i using the method described in Section 2.5. Here, k i,l is the shared key between parties P i and P l as defined in Section 2.2, and s i is the session key chosen by P i . The reasons for using keys h(k i,l , s i ) in function en() are twofold. First, any party P j is unable to work out key h(k i,j , s i ) to view D i before s i is revealed, although he knows the shared key k i,j . Second, any outsider cannot procure any key h(k i,j , s i ) to read D i even after obtaining revealed session key s i , because he does not know any key k i,j .
• F i is equal to f i (l) n−m l=1 ; that is, the concatenation of n − m values f i (l) defined in Section 2.4, and will be used by other parties to compute P i 's session key s i in Stage 4.
• V i is the concatenation of n + 1 hash values, i.e.
with w i chosen randomly by P i ) will be used in Stage 3 to show P i 's willingness for secret revealing. And
will be used in Stage 4 for validation of revealed secrets h(k i,l , N I l ) associated with P i 's key s i , as specified in Section 2.4.
(a more precise term for S i,1 should be 'authenticator' as the originality of S i,1 needs to be proved jointly by a number of parties, which is to be discussed below, but for intuitiveness we still use the term 'signature' in this paper). S i,1 is intended for a recipient P j to check the integrity of P i 's message, which will be detailed later. However, it does not prevent P i from falsely denying 574 N. ZHANG et al.
the message transmission. For instance, P i can produce the signature by using only one correct key k i,j and replacing all the other correct keys with wrong ones. P j is unable to spot this incorrect signature, and P i can later claim that P j has yielded the signature as they share key k i,j . Similarly, P j could forge P i 's signature. These problems can be eliminated by allowing more than m parties to jointly verify P i 's signature, as it is impossible for any forged signature of P i to be proven to be correct by more than m parties. The reason for this is that in the worst case scenario, where all the m dishonest parties assumed in Section 2.2 collude, they can gain at most m shared keys k i,j that are insufficient for any one of these parties to generate a signature of P i which could pass the correctness proof by more than m parties. This joint verification scheme comprises two steps. First, each party separately examines the integrity of P i 's message in terms of its signature, which is done in this stage as addressed below. Second, each party checks the originality of P i 's message by confirming that more than m parties have used the same signature for the integrity examination of the message. This will be done in Stages 2 and 3. Evidently, the success of this joint verification holds P i accountable for his (T 1 ) message.
• t 1 is the deadline by which all the parties should have executed transaction (T 1 ). This deadline is fairly loose in the sense that a party could still perform (T 1 ), subject to the condition addressed in the next stage, in case he misses the deadline due to communication failures. This is also applied to the deadlines associated with Stages 2-4.
After receiving the (T 1 ) message from P i , every party P j verifies its correctness as follows: When both of the verifications are positive, P j saves the message in his database for future reference. Otherwise P j requests P i to re-transmit the message. Note that the failure of the re-transmission does not stop P j proceeding to the next stage. The same treatment is also applied to Stages 2-4.
Stage 2-Acknowledgement broadcasting
In this stage, the parties exchange their acknowledgements of the reception of correct (i.e. successfully verified) (T 1 ) messages by executing transaction (T 2 ) below. The acknowledgement A i of a party P i is normally formed based on the signatures of all the (T 1 ) messages obtained so far. This allows different parties to cross-check whether each party has correctly executed transaction (T 1 ) to send the same message to all the others, by simply comparing different parties' acknowledgements. This comparison enables a party to spot any misbehaviour regarding the execution of transaction (T 1 ).
Transaction (T 2 ) is defined as follows:
where
it is the hash value of the concatenation of all the n (T 1 ) signatures S l,1 , if P i has got a correct (T 1 ) message from each of the n − 1 other parties. A i is empty otherwise. Note that A i takes into account any correct (T 1 ) message received before the execution of (T 2 ), even if it arrived later than t 1 . After the execution of (T 2 ), P i can still accept any (T 1 ) message but does not acknowledge its receipt. A nonempty value A i actually represents all the n (T 1 ) signatures P i holds. This is because different signatures are very likely to result in a different value A i due to the features of function h(). A i can thus be used for the joint verification of the originality of all the (T 1 ) messages as addressed in Stage 1. In other words, each recipient P j checks that A i is identical to any nonempty acknowledgement A l already held by P j , since every party was required to send the same (T 1 ) message to all the others in Stage 1. The success of this checking assures that the parties associated with these acknowledgements have all received the same n (T 1 ) messages. A failure (i.e. A i = A l ) indicates that at least one party has got different (T 1 ) messages received by others. This only happens when that party has dishonestly produced a wrong message or another party has forged his message. When A i is empty, it informs other parties that P i will not participate in Stage 4 for secret revealing, as he has not obtained a correct (T 1 ) message from every other party.
• S i,2 is P i 's signature expressed as en(c i,2 , N t 2 , k i,l n l=1 ) with c i,2 = h(I i , A i ). As with signature S i,1 , P i could send an incorrect signature S i,2 to a party P j , or P j could forge P i 's signature. This issue will be discussed in the next stage.
Having received the (T 2 ) message from P i , a party P j carries out the following verifications: When the first verification fails, P j requests P i to retransmit the message. If the second verification fails, P j may still be able to continue his operation subject to the condition specified in Stage 3.
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A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO SECURE AND FAIR DOCUMENT EXCHANGE 575 he terminates the protocol and sends out an error message before time t 2 . This is because Stage 4 demands at least m + 1 honest parties to each reveal n secrets, which makes m + 1 secrets per party available for others to compute his session key using the method described in Section 2.4. To meet this demand, we need at least 2m + 1 parties to participate in order to secure the secret revealing process, even under the circumstances where m parties among them are dishonest and unlawfully withhold the release of their secrets. However, these (T 2 ) messages imply that such participation cannot be fulfilled since there are fewer than 2m + 1 parties, each of which is willing to reveal n secrets.
Stage 3-Willingness announcement
In this stage, the parties initiate exchange of secrets associated with all the session keys by announcing their willingnesses for secret revealing. This is implemented by transaction (T 3 ) below. The willingness of a party P i is signified by w i , which is known only by P i and verifiable by any other party using the hash value v i,0 (i.e. h(w i , N I i )) in the item V i of P i 's (T 1 ) message. By disclosing w i , P i can convince other parties that he is undeniably willing to reveal his possessed secrets in Stage 4.
To perform transaction (T 3 ), a party P i needs to meet the following condition: (a) P i has multicast a (T 2 ) message, and A i in the (T 2 ) message is nonempty and equal to those in 2m correct (T 2 ) messages received by P i from other parties.
This condition assures the correct originality of all the n (T 1 ) messages. This is because even in the worst case, where m out of the 2m + 1 (T 2 ) messages contain forged signatures, the other (T 2 ) messages can still show that the same (T 1 ) message of every party has been obtained and verified successfully by m + 1 different parties. Thus, no party could forge another party's (T 1 ) message, or falsely deny the transmission of his (T 1 ) message, without being detected, as already discussed in Stage 1.
If P i does not meet the condition above, i.e. he has not received all the (T 1 ) messages or cannot confirm their originality due to an insufficient number of (T 2 ) messages received, then he will not perform transaction (T 3 ). Transaction (T 3 ) is defined as follows:
When P i 's (T 3 ) message arrives, each party P j does the following verification if he has P i 's (T 1 ) message:
• Checks that h(w i , N I i ) is equal to v i,0 in the item V i of P i 's (T 1 ) message.
If they are not identical, P j requests P i to re-transmit the message.
Stage 4-Secret revealing
In this stage, the parties reveal their possessed secrets so that they can use these secrets to compute all the session keys, and then apply them to decrypt all the encrypted documents. The secrets are revealed by transaction (T 4 ) to be defined below. That is, each party P i multicasts n secrets h(k l,i , N I i ) (1 ≤ l ≤ n), denoted by X i , along with a sufficient number of willingnesses, denoted by W i , showing that the parties associated with these willingnesses also like to reveal secrets. The provision of the willingnesses is to assure other parties that it is safe to reveal their secrets, as will be discussed later.
To perform transaction (T 4 ), each party P i needs to satisfy one of the following conditions:
(1) P i holds at least 2m+1 correct (T 3 ) messages including his own, or (2) P i does not satisfy condition (1) above, but has announced a correct (T 3 ) message and has got a correct (T 4 ) message from a party P y .
The satisfaction of condition (1) above implies that at least 2m + 1 parties each possess all the parties' encrypted documents, and that at least m + 1 parties among them are honest and will reveal and multicast all the secrets possessed. The successful multicasting will allow each party to work out all the session keys using the method described in Section 2.4.
Condition (2) above says that P i is willing to reveal n secrets, but does not want to do so before he is assured that at least 2m other parties are each willing to reveal n secrets as well. This assurance is promised by the (T 4 ) message received, as will be addressed below. Obviously transaction (T 4 ) is not performed at all if no party meets condition (1) .
Transaction (T 4 ) is defined as follows:
signifying the concatenation of n secrets h(k l,i , N I i ) revealed by P i .
• W i is the concatenation of (T 3 ) messages, which is formed based on two cases. In the first case where condition (1) is met, W i comprises at least 2m + 1 correct (T 3 ) messages held by P i , i.e. W i = (I l w l ) 1≤l≤n . In the second case where condition (2) is satisfied, W i is simply equal to W y contained in the (T 4 ) message received from P y . W i can assure each recipient P j that there are at least 2m+1 parties who are each willing to reveal n secrets, and it is thus safe for P j to reveal his possessed secrets if he meets condition (2). P j gets this assurance by confirming that every value w l in W i passes the check described in Stage 3.
Since X i and W i are both verifiable by any recipient who has procured all the n (T 1 ) messages, no signature is needed in this transaction.
When P i 's message arrives, each party P j does the following verifications only if he possesses all the n (T 1 ) messages: If either of these two verifications fails, P j asks P i to retransmit the message. Otherwise, P j executes (T 4 ), provided that he meets condition (2) .
Deadline t 4 should be set with regard to communication delays and failures so as to allow P i to repeat transaction (T 4 ) in case he does not receive enough (T 4 ) messages from other parties within an expected period.
Having procured and successfully verified any m + 1 (T 4 ) messages, a party P i with all the n correct (T 1 ) messages can apply the secrets revealed in these (T 4 ) messages, together with items F l in the (T 1 ) messages, to derive all the session keys s l using the method described in Section 2.4. He then uses each session key s l and data item E l in P l 's (T 1 ) message to recover and check P l 's document as follows:
and verifies that
If the verification fails, P i multicasts an error message, but does not terminate the protocol as other parties should be allowed to recover and confirm P l 's incorrect message in Stage 5. This failure occurs when P l accidentally or maliciously sent out a wrong item E l or F l in his (T 1 ) message. Thus P l is held responsible for his behaviour.
Stage 5-Message recovery
When a party P i has held n correct (T 1 ), 2m + 1 (T 2 ), and m+1 (T 4 ) messages, he can claim the success of the protocol run, as these messages enable P i to verify and decrypt all the documents. Otherwise, P i has not got enough messages to confirm the success of the protocol run. This could be caused by some of the following cases: (i) some messages could be corrupted on their way to P i due to communication failures or malicious attacks; (ii) these messages might even not be transmitted to P i by some dishonest parties; or (iii) the current protocol run will not succeed. Under these circumstances, P i ought to recover necessary messages from other parties in order to obtain all the decrypted documents, or to confirm the failure of the protocol run. This is the task of this final stage, which is implemented by the transaction (T 5 ) below. That is, P i simply sends to other parties the lists R i,1 , R i,2 and R i,3 of requested (T 1 ), (T 2 ) and (T 4 ) messages, respectively, and then decides the result of the protocol run based on responses from the others.
Transaction (T 5 ) is of the following form:
is the concatenation of the identities of the parties from which P i has not received (T 1 ) messages, i.e. R i,1 = I l 1≤l≤n . R i,1 is empty if P i has got all the n correct (T 1 ) messages.
• Similarly, R i,2 is the concatenation of the identities of the parties from which P i has not received (T 2 ) messages. It is empty if P i has obtained 2m + 1 correct (T 2 ) messages. 3 is the concatenation of the identities of the parties from which P i has not received (T 4 ) messages. It is empty if P i has got m + 1 correct (T 4 ) messages.
• C i is a copy of P i 's (T 4 ) message if P i meets condition (1) or (2) defined in Stage 4, and empty otherwise. The purpose for the inclusion of C i in the message is to enable those parties who each issued a correct (T 3 ) message, but did not meet any one of conditions (1) and (2), to satisfy condition (2) after reception of nonempty item C i , so that these parties can still reveal their secrets in this stage.
• τ i is the time at which this (T 5 ) message is issued.
Note that the transmission of a wrong signature or forgery of a signature as mentioned in the previous stages does not really cause any problem for the signature in transaction (T 5 ). This is because transaction (T 5 ) only sends out a request, and any dispute about its signature does not alter the result of the protocol run.
When receiving the (T 5 ) message, a party P j carries out the following verifications: If either of the verifications has failed, P j asks P i to retransmit the message. Otherwise, P j forwards to P i any possessed (T 1 ), (T 2 ) and (T 4 ) messages listed in R i,1 , R i,2 and R i,3 respectively. In addition, if P j has not issued his own (T 4 ) message and now satisfies condition (2) defined in Stage 4 due to the reception of nonempty C i , he can still issue his (T 4 ) message and conveys it to P i . If P j does not have any message requested by P i , P j does nothing.
P i may repeat transaction (T 5 ) at regular intervals until enough requested messages have been received. P i then verifies the correctness of all these messages, computes all the session keys, and uses these keys to decrypt all the documents, as described in the earlier stages.
In the case where P i has obtained n (T 5 ) messages, including his own one, each of which embraces an empty item C l , P i is convinced that the protocol run is unsuccessful, because no party wants to issue a (T 4 ) message for secret revealing.
As no deadline is assigned to transaction (T 5 ), it is possible that only a dishonest party satisfies condition (1) defined in Stage 4, but does not multicast his (T 4 ) message until a very late time so as to gain some advantage over the others. In other words, the party can manipulate the success of the protocol run. It is worth mentioning that this problem does not cause the violation of atomicity specified in Section 2.1, because if the dishonest party gets all the documents by executing transaction (T 4 ), any other party will eventually get all the documents as well.
To prevent the above problem, we set a deadline t 5 (>t 4 ) for the issuing of any new (T 4 ) messages. This means that any party who has not issued or multicast his (T 4 ) message will not issue the message after t 5 , irrespective of whether he meets condition (1) or (2) given in Stage 4. This restriction has the following effects:
(i) After t 5 , every party can still forward any possessed (T 1 ), (T 2 ) and (T 4 ) messages issued before t 5 to other parties upon their requests. This allows a party with unreliable communication channels to eventually receive requested messages in the case of a successful protocol run. (ii) t 5 is defined based on the assumption that if a party meeting condition (1) has multicast his (T 4 ) message correctly, the duration of t 5 is long enough for at least 2m other parties to meet condition (1) or (2), i.e. some of these parties meet condition (1) after Stage 3, and each of the others can meet condition (2) after receipt of a correct (T 4 ) message before t 5 . This can be accomplished by repeating transaction (T 4 ) or (T 5 ), or even by other means of communication, e.g. a fax machine, when the underlining network is broken down for a long period. The assumption implies that at least m + 1 out of these 2m + 1 parties are honest and can certainly multicast or issue their (T 4 ) messages before t 5 . This ensures that every party will finally obtain m+1 (T 4 ) messages, possibly by repeating (T 5 ) even after t 5 . The assumption also implies that when a party has acquired n − m (T 5 ) messages issued after t 5 , each of which contains an empty item C l , he concludes that the protocol run is unsuccessful, because fewer than m + 1 parties could issue (T 4 ) messages. (iii) If the dishonest party mentioned earlier issues his (T 4 ) message after t 5 , and includes it in his (T 5 ) message to request other (T 4 ) messages, then at least the honest parties will not respond to this request. As a result, he will not be able to obtain their session keys.
Intuitively, the protocol operations for a party P i are depicted in Figure 2 with all the message re-transmission, reception and verification omitted for simplicity.
THE PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section we analyse the protocol presented in Section 3 to demonstrate how it complies with the requirements set out in Section 2.1.
Viability:
A successful run of the protocol ensures that every party is able to decrypt and read all the valid documents. This is illustrated in detail as follows:
• Unforgeability: Though no asymmetric encryption is utilised, the joint signature verification scheme is still able to assure message originalities. In other words, it is impossible for a dishonest party to forge another party's valid session key and document.
• Verifiability: Each stage of the protocol involves several verifications to prove the correctness of each message received, as described in Section 3.
• Non-repudiation of receipt: A successful protocol run prevents a party P i from false denial of receipt of any other parties' secrets and documents. This is because the secrets and documents are available for P i to collect, and it is P i 's responsibility to (repeatedly) request them from the other parties in Stage 5.
Atomicity:
The satisfaction of this requirement by the protocol is demonstrated in the following cases:
(i) If a protocol run is successful, then at least m + 1 honest parties issued their (T 4 ) messages before t 5 , and can forward the messages to any other parties upon their requests. In other words, every party can eventually obtain all necessary messages to work out all the session keys and to decrypt and read all the documents. (ii) If a protocol run is terminated in Stage 2 as a result of more than n − 2m − 1 (T 2 ) messages with empty acknowledgements, then no party is able to work out any other's session key as no secrets will be revealed. (iii) If a protocol run is unsuccessful due to the identification of a wrong item F l or E l , then the guilty party associated with the wrong item is easily recognised as 578 N. ZHANG et al.
described in Section 3, and the correct session keys of all the other parties are computable. This implies that all the parties' documents will be viewable but the guilty party's document is invalid. Such unfairness also happens to other protocols as it is difficult to stop a dishonest party sending out a wrong key or document. However, our protocol can certainly hold the guilty party accountable for his misbehaviour as no other party could forge his (T 1 ) message. (iv) If a protocol run is unsuccessful because there are n (T 5 ) messages, or n − m ones after t 5 with empty items C l , then no party is able to compute any other's session key as no correct (T 4 ) message was issued.
Efficiency:
The protocol adopts neither asymmetric nor symmetric encryption, but instead utilises hash and polynomial functions for its design. As shown in [20] , secure communication based on hash and polynomial functions is more efficient than that using asymmetric or symmetric encryption. Moreover, our method for secure communication is even more efficient than the one in [20] , as discussed in Section 2.5. This certainly reduces the amount of processing overhead placed on each party. However, this is achieved by the increased traffic load, as indicated in Section 2.5. Additionally, the protocol places equal workloads on each party to avoid any performance bottleneck. Normally, a party only needs to execute four transactions (T 1 )-(T 4 ) to complete an exchange process. When communication failures or malicious attacks occur, transaction (T 5 ) and necessary message re-transmissions may be required.
Assurance: This is illustrated by the following scenarios:
(i) Messages are intercepted by an outsider (not involved in the protocol run) while they are in transit. This does not cause any security problem as the document in any (T 1 ) message is encrypted and its key cannot be inferred by the outsider from any (T 2 )-(T 5 ) messages. (ii) A message on its way from a party P i to another party P j is intercepted, altered and re-transmitted by either an outsider or an insider. This altered message can be easily recognised by P j during its correctness verifications. Consequently, P j requests P i to retransmit the message when the associated deadline is not overdue. Availability: The protocol is resilient to the reality that the underlying network may be unreliable, and that the message exchange process may be under attack from both insiders and outsiders. Suppose that a communication channel between two parties is unreliable and insecure. Then a message may be accidentally corrupted (i.e. it is erroneous on arrival) or maliciously altered during its transmission over the channel. This problem is easy to detect by the recipient's verifications, and the sender is thus required to re-transmit the message. As addressed earlier, the problem does not affect the protocol security. Moreover, the protocol operation may still be able to continue even after all the retransmissions have failed. This tolerance is demonstrated by the following scenarios: 
Applicability:
The protocol does not impose any restriction on parties' computational capabilities. Though it requires the parties' clocks to be loosely synchronised due to the deadlines associated with each stage of the protocol, the time service offered by existing networks [21, 22] is sufficient to meet this requirement. Hence, our protocol is suited to distributed and heterogeneous network platforms. Moreover, in a less distrustful situation, these deadlines can be removed.
In the case where a party's clock is not correctly synchronised, the only scenario which could benefit dishonest parties is that the party is honest and sends out THE COMPUTER JOURNAL, Vol. 42, No. 7, 1999 A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO SECURE AND FAIR DOCUMENT EXCHANGE 579 his first (T 4 ) message after time t 5 due to his clock showing an incorrect time earlier than t 5 , and no other parties have issued any (T 4 ) messages before t 5 . Obviously this (T 4 ) message could be exploited by the m dishonest parties in collusion to decrypt all the documents. As any significant delay of the clock can be easily spotted by the party, the above problem can be avoided by assigning a reasonably long duration to t 5 .
The protocol assumes that over half the parties are honest. An example of such cases is that more than half of the parties are large or reputed companies which will not risk their reputation to misbehave for some small gain. For other cases where this assumption does not hold, i.e. m ≥ (n + 1)/2, the protocol is still applicable but requires the assistance of one or more independent trusted parties. Suppose that only one trusted party P T is employed. To meet the assumption, there should exist (at least) m + 1 honest parties, i.e. the total number of parties should be 2m + 1. This implies that we need to add 2m − n + 1 honest parties P l (n < l ≤ 2m + 1) whose roles are each played by P T . For example, in the case of a two-party exchange, if at most one party may misbehave as assumed by the protocol in [11] , i.e. n = 2 and m = 1, then only one additional honest party (i.e. P T ) is needed. Where both parties may misbehave, i.e. n = m = 2, three honest parties need to be added, but each of them can be played by P T .
The multiple roles of P T are implemented as follows. P l 's identity is denoted as I l = I T l, where I T is P T 's identity, and P l 's document D l is simply empty. The shared key k l,i between P l and any other party P i is expressed as
where sk T is P T 's private key and k T ,i is the shared key between P T and P i . This enables all the 2m + 1 parties to properly operate the protocol presented in Section 3.
Additionally, if any party P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) does not want P T to view his document D i , he can send D i only to each party P j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) and nothing to any party P l (n < l ≤ 2m + 1) in Stage 1 of the protocol run. This means that E i in P i 's (T 1 ) message should be en (D i 
In this way, P T only assists the protocol in the revelation of session keys without being able to view any document D i .
The method can be further simplified to reduce the amount of processing and the number of messages. This can be achieved by using only one of the parties P l (n < l ≤ 2m + 1), e.g. P n+1 , to delegate all of them for communication with any party P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), i.e. for each transaction only P n+1 sends a message to and receives a message from P i . As P n+1 has no document to exchange, E n+1 and F n+1 in P n+1 's (T 1 ) message are both empty, and V n+1 comprises only one value v n+1,0 for the verification of P n+1 's willingness. Additionally, P n+1 's (T 2 ) and (T 3 ) messages should each be counted as 2m − n + 1 messages, and P n+1 's (T 4 ) message should be expressed as I n+1 X n+1 . . . I 2m+1 X 2m+1 W n+1 ; that is, the collection of 2m − n + 1 (T 4 ) messages from parties P l , except that one item W n+1 is sufficient for the proof of safe secret release.
COMPARISONS WITH RELATED WORK
In this section we compare our protocol with other protocols for multi-party fair exchange.
Comparison 1
Reference [2] presents a protocol for multi-party fair exchange with assistance from a semi-trusted neutral party, which is based on the protocol for two-party fair exchange described in [11] . The two-party protocol allows two parties to exchange secret keys for decryption of their documents. To achieve this, each party decides two values that are sufficient to compute his secret key, exchanges the first value for that of the other party, and sends the second value, together with relevant data, to the semi-trusted neutral party. Having received the second values from both parties, the neutral party verifies their correctness and forwards the second value of one party to the other if the verification is successful. An optimised version of the protocol is also given in [11] to reduce the number of messages generated.
The two-party protocol utilises one-way functions to improve its efficiency, and assumes that messages are private and authenticated, which seems to be fulfilled by asymmetric cryptography. The neutral party is called semitrusted because it may misbehave but does not collude with either of the other two parties, and it could be a randomly selected member of the network. The protocol also assumes that at most one of the three parties misbehaves.
The multi-party protocol is an extension of the two-party protocol with the same assumptions.
The main problem with this multi-party protocol is its restricted applicability, due to the principal assumption that at most one party misbehaves. The reasons for this are twofold. First, when the neutral party is chosen randomly from members of the network, it is difficult to decide how much the party should be trusted. If it is dishonest, the fairness of the protocol has to rely on the honesty of all the other parties. If these parties are all honest they do not need any fair exchange protocol. Second, it is impractical to restrict the number of dishonest parties to one. As pointed out in [11] , the protocol offers little protection when two or more parties conspire against others.
Additionally, the design principle of the protocol is still similar to that of other protocols based on weak trusted parties. That is, the protocol's fairness depends on the neutral party that performs a different operation from those performed by the participants involved in the exchange. Thus, some special measures have to be taken to assure proper operation by the neutral party. Though reference [2] has mentioned that the role of the neutral party could be distributed among two or more neutral parties, no details have been given.
Our protocol differs from the multi-party protocol mentioned above in the following aspects. First, our protocol imposes no limit on the number of dishonest parties. It needs no semi-trusted or trusted neutral party when less than half of the parties are dishonest or even collude. Otherwise, one or more honest neutral parties, which could be nominated and agreed by all the parties involved, can be added to secure the exchange without any change to the protocol. Hence it offers better applicability and flexibility. Second, the design principle of our protocol is different in that it does not distinguish honest neutral parties from ordinary ones, and the operations performed by the neutral parties are exactly the same as those by the ordinary parties. Thus no special measure needs to be implemented for any particular party.
Our protocol uses neither asymmetric nor symmetric encryption and employs hash and polynomial functions to improve efficiency. The multi-party protocol in [2] mainly uses hash functions to achieve good efficiency, while private and authentic communications still rely on asymmetric and/or symmetric encryption. As quantitative efficiency comparison between these two protocols is beyond the scope of this paper, we leave this task to our future work.
Comparison 2
Reference [3] describes a protocol for multi-party fair exchange, which is based on similar ideas to those used in the two-party fair exchange protocol presented in [4] . In this multi-party protocol, each party sends his document to others and hopes that the other parties act in the same manner. When a party receives a document from another party, he needs to acknowledge the receipt by transferring a non-repudiatable token to that party. When every party has received the documents and receipts from all the others, the protocol ends successfully. Where a party has not received a document or receipt from another party, a trusted third party must be invoked to resolve the exchange between them.
The protocol uses asymmetric cryptography for private and authentic communications, and assumes that communication channels associated with each trusted third party are reliable.
One of the main problems with this multi-party protocol is its asymmetric nature, in the sense that a dishonest party can unfairly obtain a document from another party without giving out his document. Although a trusted third party is used to resolve this problem, its effectiveness is questionable because different parties may be subject to different administrative, political and legal systems, which could make dispute resolution difficult [2] . Also, dispute resolution relies on the assumption that communication to/from a trusted third party is reliable, which is unrealistic in current network environments. Note that although the measures taken by the protocol for two-party fair exchange in [1] can be used to improve the multi-party protocol, they still cannot eliminate these problems.
Our protocol does not have the above problems, as no party can gain documents from others without giving out his document, and the protocol does not rely on any particular party or the reliability of any particular communication channel. Similar to the comparison in Section 5.1, our design principle is also different from that of the protocol in [3] , which has to place special considerations on a trusted third party due to its special role. Moreover, our protocol adopts more efficient methods for secure communication, while the protocol in [3] is based mainly on slow asymmetric cryptography.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a novel protocol for fair document exchange among multi-parties, and analysed its conformance to the requirements set out in Section 2.1. In comparison with other protocols for fair document exchange, this new protocol demonstrates a number of interesting characteristics, e.g. integrity and originality verification without use of either asymmetric or symmetric encryption, the ability to tolerate communication failures and malicious attacks, and equal treatment among different parties including trusted ones. The flexibility of the protocol allows it to operate with no assistance of any trusted party when the majority of the parties genuinely wish to exchange their documents, and permits addition of one or more trusted parties to secure the protocol operation under the circumstances where half of the parties or more may misbehave.
For future work, we intend to verify the proposed protocol using formal analysis techniques such as those presented in [23, 24] . We also aim to implement the protocol, to assess its applicability, and to quantitatively compare its performance with that of the other protocols for fair exchange.
